

China and the Reform of Global Governance

中国和全球治理改革

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Two faces of global governance are emerging in current world. Over the last two decades, scholars and statesmen witnessed that the hegemonic model of governance for the world has been definitely declined or even failed, while the newly multilateral governance seems to be not set up accordingly during the period of systematic transition. It gives rise to a situation of governance gap in the current world. On the other hand, however, China and the other emerging countries are more proactive in advancing new initiatives for regional and global governance. It is really an interesting contrast.

当前世界全球治理的两种面貌正在显现。在过去二十年中，学者和政治家见证了霸权治理模式的失效甚至失败，而新的多边治理模式似乎还没有在这一系统过渡期内建立起来，这使得当今世界治理差距扩大。然而另一方面，中国和其它新兴国家更主动地推动地区和全球治理的新举措。这确实形成了有趣的对比。

Before I explore China's attitudes to global governance, it is useful for us to understand three thorny problems which bothering us for achieving better global governance.

在探讨中国对待全球治理的态度之前，我们有必要先理解三个较为棘手的问题，它们使全球治理难以取得良好成效。

The first is related to the domestic system and global governance. Since the financial crisis broke out in 2008, more and more countries are inclined to take protectionism policy when they address global issues. Many global governance arrangements which reached in the level of international area are unfortunately vetoed in domestic politics. In some instances, the split of domestic politics, like in the U.S. current domestic mutual veto system, illustrates that global governance will be hard to be improved without the consensus and support of domestic politics. The more mutual veto occurred in domestic politics, the lower efficiency will be accompanied with global governance. One of the typical case is the IMF governance structure reform arrangement was vetoed by the U.S. congress, and then reduce the efficiency of international financial governance.

第一个问题关于国内体制与全球治理。自从 2008 年金融危机爆发，越来越多的国家倾向于采取保护主义来处理全球事务。许多在国际层面做出的全球治理安排很不幸的在国内政治中遭到了否决。在某些情况下，国内政治的分裂，像美国当前国内的

相互否决制度，就证明了如果没有国内政治的共识和支持，全球治理状况将很难得到改善。国内政治中相互否决的情况发生的越多，全球治理的效率就会越低。一个典型的例子就是美国国会否决了国际货币基金组织（IMF）的治理体系改革方案，这大大的降低了国际金融治理的效率。

The second one is about the relations between the UN system and the regional governance framework. In the area of security issue, for example, on the one hand, partly for the reason of mutual veto among P5, the U.N. Security Council seems to be difficult to reach agreement on the resolution of some security issue, on the other hand, some regional organization began to be involved into particular country's domestic conflicts in the absence of the U.N. Security Council's approval. Does it mean that the regional organization will be likely to replace the role what the U.N. should do over the history and in international security area? It seems to us that there is no answer for it right now, what we saw is the U.N. Security Council was keeping silent in the recent Yemen case. In terms of global economic governance, the G20 must take seriously of its internal coordination, especially among G7 and BRICS 5 countries, and of its external relations with more and more regional organizations, such as the ASEAN, SCO, CELAC, AU, League of Arab States, as well as its membership EU. In the foreseeable future, the trend of regionalization of global governance means that regional economic organization will play decisive role in addressing intra-region development issues.

第二个问题是关于联合国系统与区域性治理框架间的关系。例如，在涉及安全问题的领域，一方面联合国安理会囿于五常的否决权难以达成一致，另一方面一些区域性组织开始在没有获得联合国安理会同意的情况下介入某些国家的内部冲突。这是不是意味着区域性组织可能会取代联合国在国际安全领域应当扮演的角色呢？对于这个问题目前似乎还没有答案，我们只看到了联合国安理会对最近爆发的也门动乱保持缄默。关于全球经济治理，20国集团（G20）必须注重内部协调，特别是七国集团（G7）间及金砖国家间，并加强它们与东盟、上合组织、拉美加勒比共同体、非盟、阿盟及欧盟等地区性组织的外部联系，巩固合作关系。在可以预见的未来里，全球治理的区域化趋势意味着区域性经济组织将在区域间发展问题中扮演决定性的角色。

The last one is whither should the current governance institutions go, which mostly arranged after the end of the World War Two, and how to deal with the relations between the old and the newly regional and global governance institutions. It doesn't mean that the old international institutions don't matter completely, it suggests that most of them are really facing competition from the newly institutions emerged in global governance. Unfortunately, the dynamics of reform seems to be too slowly to meet the new international situation.

最后一个问题是二战后建立起来的现行的治理制度将何去何从，以及如何处理新旧区域及全球治理制度之间的关系。这并不意味着旧的治理制度国际制度不再重要，而是旧的治理制度正在受到全球治理中新兴制度的挑战。不幸的是，改革的进程似乎过于缓慢，以至于难以与新的国际形势相适应。

Obviously, another face of global governance is emerging gradually, the attention people pay is that China is really an active player in global governance. It tries to play more responsible role and even wants to provide more public goods for the world. Only in the last two years since the Communist Party's 18th congress in 2012, China has initiated jointly with other countries some institutions for the world, such as Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS Bank, the **Asia Connectiveness** and the One Belt and One Road initiations are even grander plan for Euro-Asia continent. These recent initiations, as well as the other institutions such as SCO before, have been as China's understanding version of regional governance. How should we observe it?

显而易见的是，全球治理的另一面正逐渐显现，人们逐渐注意到中国已成为全球治理中的一个活跃的角色。中国尝试着担负起更多的责任甚至想要为世界提供更多的公共物品。自从 2012 年中国共产党的第十八次代表大会召开以来的短短两年期间，中国已经倡议并连同其他国家一起创建了一些制度，例如亚洲基础设施投资银行和金砖银行，**亚洲互联互通建设**以及“一带一路”等是对亚欧发展做出的更重大的举措。近期的这些倡议和从前设立的制度（如上合组织）一起展示了中国对区域治理的理解。我们应当如何看待中国的这些举措呢？

China is often seen to be as late comer in global governance area. The process of China's approach to global governance brings some inspiring (?) experience for the rest of the world. In the first, there is few conflict situation between China's domestic politics and global governance, the consultative democracy system in China makes it possible that domestic politics is not likely to veto international governance arrangements which Chinese government has been reached with the other countries. In the other words, the domestic implementation of any particular international governance agreements in domestic China is relative low in terms of bargaining cost. Comparing with the prevailing confrontational democracy system, or mutual veto democracy system, this consultative democracy system in China has more and more advantages in coordinating domestic and international relations together. The suggestive point here is that maybe we need to reflect deeply about this issue that is the confrontational democracy system in domestic area, which in many instances give rise to the mutual veto situation, may not be useful for the better governance of more and more transnational problems. If we want to have better global governance, we must have a cooperative and coordinative framework between domestic and international governance, does the confrontational democracy system is the optimal or suboptimal one for better global governance in an era of globalization?

中国经常被视为全球治理领域中的后来者。中国在全球治理中采取的举措为世界其他国家带来了极具启发的经验。第一，中国国内政治与全球治理间的冲突极少，中国的协商民主制度使国内政治不太可能否决中国政府与其他国家达成的国际治理决策。换言之，全球治理决策在中国国内实施的讨价还价成本较低。与流行的对抗性民主制度或相互否决民主制度相比，中国的协商民主制度在协调国内与国际事务关系的问题上有着越来越大的优势。在此我认为我们需要深刻反思对抗性民主制度，以及在某些情况下升级而来的相互否决民主制度，可能不利于更好地解决跨国问题。如果我们想要享有更有效的全球治理，我们必须拥有合作的、协调的框架以解决国内和国际的治理问题。在全球化的时代，对抗性民主制度还是我们取得更有效的全球治理所面对的最优或次优的选择吗？

In the second place, China is really deliberate in dealing with the old and the newly governance institutions relations. Actually, China doesn't want to challenge or overthrow the old global governance institutions, such as the IMF and WB. China is part one of them, why does China want to overthrow them just like some reports criticize? As mentioned before, these old institutions are facing hard reforms, but bureaucratically they act slowly. The BRICS countries in their Summit Declaration in 2014 in Brazil declare their disappointment about the reformation of the IMF and WB. In this case, China is inclined to take another way, which the Fudan Global Governance Report called as *incremental improvement way*, to upgrade current global governance structure. Therefore, when we look into the institutions carefully what China set up, most of them have complementary rather than confronting relations with the old ones. This incremental and gradual reform approach make sure that the transition of international system could be likely in a peaceful rather than radical way.

第二，中国在处理新旧治理制度之间的关系时的确经过了深思熟虑。事实上，中国不希望挑战或颠覆旧有的全球治理制度，如国际货币基金组织和世界银行。中国作为其中的一员，为什么会像一些报告指责的那样去颠覆它们呢？正如之前指出的，这些旧有的制度正面临着艰难的改革，但实际操作中这个进程进展缓慢。金砖国家在2014年巴西峰会上表达了他们对国际货币基金组织和世界银行改革进程的失望。在这种情况下，中国倾向于采取其他措施，即被复旦全球治理报告称为“全球治理的增量改进”的方式推动现有全球治理结构升级。因此，当我们深入观察中国建立的制度，它们大多是对旧有制度的补充而非对抗。这种渐进式的改革措施确保了国际体系的转变将沿着和平的而非激进的路径推进。

Lastly, in case of regional governance, China seems to strengthen connectiveness rather than integration between China and its neighbour countries. Over the last years, the EU experience in integration process has been widely seen to be as regional governance model for the developing regions. Concerning the Asian area, however, the EU integration governance model maybe not be suitable for Asian regional governance. The major reason

for it is that there is nearly no country in Asia who want to be integrated into a super-national institution, like the EU experience, dominated by few big countries in it. Therefore, the feasible way is to improve connectiveness in the area of infrastructure, FDI, policy and administration cooperation among Asian countries. From this angle, China will concentrate more on regional governance, especially with its neighbour countries. As a guiding principle, China will try to develop its own regional governance theory, it is not likely the simple copy of the EU integration to Asia, as an alternative way, China will focuses on it along with the connectiveness rather than integration theory in the future. Perhaps, connectiveness approach has even more implications for strengthening better governance in Africa and other regions. Then what does it mean for the coming 2016 G20 Summit in Hangzhou, China? My personal brief recommendation points are the followings. Firstly, the G20 should try to list and reduce the veto points step by step between international economic cooperation and domestic politics; secondly, the G20 should encourage institutional innovations in regional or trans-regional governance, such as the AIIB and BRICS Bank, it also needs to consider the possibility of building strongly dialogue partner with ASEAN, SCO, CELAC, AU, League of Arab States. Thirdly, the G20 may concentrate on the new idea of development for a more balancing, inclusive, and sustainable world. I personally think it doesn't matter to discuss over which standard of rules are the highest for the global economic governance, the most important thing for the current world is which standard of rules are suitable for the wealth of the most rather than the least countries and their people. It represents the real democratization of global governance.

最后，在区域治理层面，中国似乎更注重加强与邻国间的互联互通而非一体化。在过去的几年中，欧盟在区域一体化方面的进展被广泛的视为发展中地区区域治理的典范。然而考虑到亚洲地区的情况，欧盟一体化的治理模式似乎并不适用于亚洲。一个主要的原因在于，没有哪个亚洲国家愿意被整合进一个像欧盟那样的由少数大国主导的超国家机制中。因此，一个可行的方式就是提高基础设施、海外直接投资、政策和行政合作领域的互联互通和合作。从这个角度讲，中国将更多的关注区域性治理，特别是与邻国间的合作。作为指导性原则，中国将在未来尝试发展其自己的区域治理理论。或许，互联互通措施为加强非洲及其他区域的良好治理也提供了更多的借鉴意义。那么如何看待 2016 年将在杭州举办的 G20 峰会？我个人的简要建议有如下几点。第一，G20 应该尝试着一步步减少国际经济合作与国内政治间的否决点；第二，G20 应该鼓励区域性或跨区域型治理层面的制度创新，例如亚洲基础设施投资银行和金砖银行。G20 也需要考虑加强与东盟、上合组织、非盟和阿盟等伙伴间的对话。第三，G20 可能专注于提出关于更平衡、包容和可持续世界的新想法。我个人认为并不需要探讨全球经济治理的最高标准和规则，于现在的世界而言最重要的是，应当去探讨适应大多数国家而非少数国家及其国民追求财富的标准和规则。它代表了全球治理中真正的民主。

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